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The project of a theory of value as it was pursued by John Dewey and Lewis Hahn among
others in Value: A Cooperative Inquiry1 has been largely abandoned in recent years in favor of a
theory of valuational consistency.  The trends that I am pointing to here embrace such areas as
game theory, decision theory, and the logic of preference.  Little is said about what it means to
value something, and how doing so relates to the claim that something "has value," but much
concerning what a rational set of interests and aims is relative to a given, variable set of basal
valuations.  What results is a consideration of the formal conditions of consistent valuation, as
opposed to a consideration of what constitutes valuation itself, its conditions and consequences;
what in a stronger sense may be called rational valuation.
There might be many reasons cited for this shift from constitutive to formal issues, but I
think one main reason for the shift is a problem that has dogged questions of value for centuries--
viz., without any clear ontological basis by which we can make the claim that values are in some
sense "in the world," there appears to be no basis upon which to speak of "common values" in the
full-blooded sense at all,2 although we may save some scientific respectability for value inquiry
by noting that people do have interests, goals, aims, etc., as a matter of psychological fact, and
exploring the criteria of internal consistency within a given set of such valuings.  This is
reinforced by views that partly stem from philosophical trends, and partly from themes in the
general culture.  Among the former is the view, especially popular in continental political
thought, that accepted values are a function of certain historical and cultural interests, and since
history is (or was) a contingent matter (things might have gone differently), so are the
supervening values.  The well-known work of Michel Foucault developed along these lines.  A
broader, cultural attitude that contributes to the rejection of constitutive issues is the suspicion
that to assert the existence of common or universal values is inconsistent with a recognition of
and tolerance for the plurality of values inter- and intra-culturally.
The upshot of these philosophical and cultural currents of thought is the view that trying
to find answers to questions concerning the conditions of valuation and the criteria of rational
values is a fruitless affair born of muddleheaded thinking all of which can be cleared up simply
by abandoning the project and taking constitutive values as either the cultural or psychological
preconditions of the application, but not the content, of cogent value inquiry, much as true
propositions constitute the precondition of the application of formal logical theory.3  I wish to
argue here that the pessimism expressed in these views is, in fact, unwarranted--that not only do
people accept many of the same values, but that they could hardly do otherwise, in which case
constitutive questions of value are meaningful and important.
I will pursue the issue by offering a line of argument that aims at the conclusion that the
notion of radically different and incommensurable systems of value is incoherent, which would
mean that the presumption of some significant common ground of valuation is rationally required
in value inquiry.
There is little doubt that the notion of value is bound with the notion of intentional action. 
When we say that someone values something, we offer an account of a stable practical
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commitment that is central to anticipatory predictions and retrospective explanations of that
person's behavior.  If we are told that someone values intellectual discussion, we then can readily
explain why it is that he or she in the past has organized discussion groups, attended conferences
on cerebral topics, sought out people who have interesting things to say, etc., and we will readily
predict that the person will continue to do these things in the future.
Another sign of the close relationship between valuing and pragmatic intention, I think, is
that the strength of claims that various animals have interests beyond those that devolve to
matters of pure biology correlates with how sensible or natural it is to attribute intentional action
to these animals.  It seems quite natural to say that dogs like meaty bones, dogs being of a level
of behavioral sophistication such that it also seems quite natural to say that a dog digging in the
dirt is trying to retrieve the bone she buried yesterday.  Similar claims make sense with respect to
most mammals generally.4  On the other hand, although phototropisms can be observed in very
simple organisms, it seems to make little sense to say that such organisms intend to pursue light,
and just as little sense to say that they like light, or have an interest in light.
Now, in view of this, what I wish to argue is that our understanding of intentional actions
is dependent on the attribution of interests and values to agents, such that if we have no way of
making such attributions, we likewise have no basis upon which to make the claim that a given
behavior is intentional at all.  If this is so, then the attribution of wholly different interests to an
agent whose actions we interpret to be intentional is incoherent, and some common core must be
presumed.
It has been a staple of action theory of the past forty years or so that intentions can be
understood in terms of beliefs and desires, or, more broadly, "pro-attitudes."  When we attribute
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an intention to someone, we attribute a belief and desire to that person that conjointly are
understood as causes or reasons of the action in question.  Thus if Mary drives to the store for a
loaf of bread to have with her soup for dinner, the claim "Mary intends to buy a loaf of bread"
can be understood as entailing the conjoint claims "Mary desires to buy a loaf of bread" and
"Mary believes that bread can be purchased at the store."  Significant revision in one of these
claims will require revision in the other as its ascription is relevant to explaining intention.  So if
Mary, as she is pulling up to the store, tells us that in fact she has no desire for bread, her belief
that bread can be purchased at the store, if she has it, can no longer explain her intention, and the
ascription of other beliefs relevant to other desires must be considered.  Likewise, if she tells us
that she had no idea that bread could be purchased at the store, her desire for bread, if she has
such, is no longer relevant to explaining her intentions.
Now in such instances, what determines which beliefs and desires provide the most
plausible interpretation of intentions?  The answer, it seems to me, is those beliefs and desires
that are most reasonable from our own standpoint in light of the agent's overall behavior.  Donald
Davidson has argued that the interpretation of another's assertions requires a tradeoff between
reasonable attributions of meanings and beliefs to a speaker, a tradeoff which starts with the
assumption of a significant overlap of common beliefs.5  I suggest a similar commonality must
hold with respect to standing motivations when interpreting the intentions of agents.  By
"standing motivations" I mean stable interests and goals that regularly enter into our intentions as
felt desires. 
Consider again Mary's case.  If we know she was preparing soup for dinner, and see her
leave the soup simmering, go to the store, and purchase a loaf of bread, the reasonable
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interpretation based on the presumption of a general congruence of beliefs and desires would be
that she intends to eat bread with dinner.  Even if we wouldn't eat bread with our soup, other
more broadly defined desires, such as a varied diet for the purposes of nutrition, or the pleasures
of eating foods in a meal of complementary flavors and textures, can lead to an accurate
explanation.  If subsequent behavior falsifies the interpretation, the search can be renewed on the
basis of the presumption of general congruence.
Now, the central question is this: What could we conclude without the presumption of a
general congruence of desires and beliefs?  Since behavioral evidence underdetermines
interpretations of intentions, nothing at all could be inferred--with no alternative heuristic
criterion, there is no basis for assessing the relative probabilities of the possible explanations, and
the possible explanations are endless.  Would it help if we were to presume overall congruence
of beliefs, but not desires?  This would of course rule out beliefs that we take as false.  But the
beliefs by which we interpret others' actions are in most cases standing beliefs which we attribute
to agents as active beliefs.  The issue here is one of relevance: Which of our standing beliefs is
relevant to this action in this set of circumstances?  Our usual clue here is reasonable desire. 
Without the presumption of congruence, this is not available, and possible explanations
proliferate.  Considering Mary again, Mary might want an organic sponge, to which her belief
that bread is organic and spongelike is relevant; or she might want a table ornament of a beige
color (to complement a certain room's color scheme), to which her belief concerning the color of
bread is relevant; or she might want something that is roughly five inches square to plug up the
five-inch-square hole in her septic pipe, to which her belief concerning the dimensions of a
typical loaf is relevant, and so on.
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General congruence, of course, doesn't mean complete congruence--we recognize that
people have different motivations, both in terms of long-term, standing interests, and felt desires
in particular situations.  But it is in the context of shared interests that motivational variance is
recognized.  I might not have any wish to free-climb a mountain, because of the danger involved,
but I do understand the desire for an exciting pastime that provides diversion from humdrum
routine, and with an imaginative adjustment of my fear threshold, the point of the free-climbing
becomes clear.
The strategy of interpretation in this and other cases of motivational variance seems to go
roughly something like this.  There are certain broad domains of motivation in which interests
and desires are arranged hierarchically, from quite general and long-range goals and interests to
ones that are more specifically defined and sought in more narrowly circumscribed contexts. 
Interests of lower generality are instances of the more general interests, which allows a route to
be traced from the particular to the general.  The interest in free-climbing is an instance of an
interest in pleasant vigorous activity, which is in turn an instance of an interest in diversionary
pleasures, etc.  When someone's behavior is puzzling, we are able to interpret the behavior by
finding a common interest of higher generality, and then using contextual clues and imaginative
psychological adjustments to follow the path to more specific interests and desires.  A political
leader who orders an attack on a neighboring country may be acting from ambition or self-
protection, generally shared motivations that identify relevant behavioral and contextual tests of
our interpretations.  Evidence of the depletion of crucial natural resources in the leader's country,
and abundant resources in the neighboring country, would suggest more particularly economic
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ambition, and aggressive behavior in the past would provide evidence of dispositions which are
consistent with this interpretation.
What this line of argument suggests, I think, is that the presumption that intentional
action takes place within a broad motivational context that is interpersonally congruent in general
character is not eliminable from the strategies of pragmatic interpretation.  Without this
presumption, interpretations of intention fail, and the best we can do is cite behavioral
regularities that fall far short of an account of intention.
But more than this, it is hard to understand without this presumption in place how we
could interpret an action as intentional at all.  Consider an example of perplexing behavior.  A
psychologist observes her patient backing a wheelchair into the corner of a room, while issuing
nautical orders in a commanding voice: "2/3rds astern!" "Belay the breast rope smartly mister!"
etc.  What is the psychologist to think?6  If the patient, in a more lucid moment when his
behavior is appropriate to circumstances, tells her of his experience during the curious episode
(e.g., "I thought I was docking the Queen Mary"), she has evidence of delusional belief and an
avenue to align her standing motivations to the delusional context in a "what if" manner, much as
we would enter into a child's imaginary play.7  Interpretation in this case becomes possible. 
Without this avenue, however, there is no more reason to take the behavior as acting within a
delusion than as an unconscious pantomime of intentional behavior, such as we commonly
understand sleepwalking.
I'll offer two conclusions from these considerations.  First, there is a web of common
standing motivations and beliefs that provide the basis of behavioral interpretation.  This web
may be more or less attenuated on the basis of variation in cultural and environmental
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circumstances, but it cannot break altogether within the boundaries of recognizable intentional
agency.  Judgments of reasonable valuation are assessed within this motivational web.
Secondly, a common motivational framework provides the basis upon which discrepant
valuations are coordinated and understood.  As we can understand the rock-climber's motivation
by an imaginative shift in fear threshold, and Mary's interest in bread by placing ourselves within
her motivational context, so generally discrepancies in valuation can be reconciled by an
imaginative shift upward in a given motivational domain coupled with such adjustments in
psychology dispositions and practical context as is suggested on an empirical basis.  Such
strategies are a staple of our sympathetic understanding of the whys and wherefores of others. 
This does not, of course, rule out the possibility of irreconcilable differences, but it does mean
that discordant valuations do have a common motivational ground.
I have offered nothing here by way of suggesting what values are, or how valuations
should be assessed.  But if, as I have argued, we must presume a common core of motivation
among all intentional agents, there is, no doubt, some considerable territory that can be
philosophically explored.  Any concern of radical incommensurability of values can be safely put
aside since it is seriously entertained only on pain of incoherence, and further inquiry into the
psychological and contextual grounds of valuation, and the content of rational values, can
proceed on an empirical basis.  In short, constitutive investigation concerning values and
valuation is an endeavor that was not well abandoned, and is well worth a second look.
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     1 Ed. Ray Lepley (New York: Columbia University, 1949).
     2 As Lewis Hahn noted in "A Contextualist Looks at Values" (Lepley, op. cit., 112-114)
metaphysical views do seem to play a role in the stances that value theorists take to the status of
value.  If this is true, then the flight from metaphysics in twentieth century thought might offer an
additional explanation of the flight from constitutive issues in value inquiry.  A return to these
issues, I think, may well require taking a metaphysics of value seriously.  In this paper, however,
I will try to initiate a return not by explaining what value is, but arguing the more fundamental
claim that common values must be recognized.
     3 The method is well represented in the following passage by James G. March and Herbert A.
Simon: "When we first encounter the rational man of economics and statistical decision theory in
the decision-making situation he already has laid out before him the whole set of alternatives
from which he will choose his action.  This set of alternatives is simply 'given'; the theory does
not tell how it is obtained . . ." [Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958), p. 137.
     4 It might be thought that the key to this correlation is not intentional action, but
consciousness.  Animals that are conscious, to the degree they are conscious, can be said to have
interests or to value things.  But an animal that has quite acute conscious sensations of pain,
warmth, light, etc., and yet lacks any interests seems perfectly conceivable.  I suspect that the
attribution of intentional action does presume consciousness, but the attribution of levels of
consciousness do not appear to imply the presence of interests.
ENDNOTES
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     5 See "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 195-97.
     6 This example was suggested to me some years ago by Matthew Kelly, although he drew
somewhat different conclusions from it.
     7 Cf. an episode reported by Oliver Sacks, where a peculiar form of behavior was explained by
one of his patients: "As I was writing notes at my desk, I perceived through the open door
Seymour L. careering down the corridor; he had been walking pretty normally, and then,
suddenly, accelerated, festinant, precipitated. . . .  He recovered, however, and was able to
proceed without further incident to the nursing station near my desk.  He was obviously in a rage,
and a panic, and bewildered: 'Why the hell do they leave the passage like that? . . .  It's got a
bloody great hole in it. . . .'  'Mr. L.,' the nurse replied.  'You're not making sense.  I assure you
the passage is perfectly normal.'  At this point I got up . . . and suggested to Mr. L. and the nurse
that we walk back together, to find out about the 'excavation'.  Seymour walked between us,
unconsciously attuning his pace to ours, and we walked the length of the passage together
without any incident--and without any hint of festination or precipitation.  This absence of
incident left Seymour confounded.  'I'll be damned,' he said.  'You're perfectly right. . . .  But'--he
turned to me, and spoke with an emphasis and a conviction I have never forgotten--'I could have
sworn it suddenly dipped, just as I said.  It was because it dipped that I was forced into a run. 
You'd do the same if you felt the ground falling away, in a steep slope under your feet!  I ran as
anyone would run, with such a feeling.  What you call ‘festination’ is no more than a normal
reaction to an abnormal perception.'" [Awakenings (New York: Dutton, 1983), pp. 298f.]
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